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e National Treatment Requirements of the Berne 
and Universal Copyright Conventions 
Part Two** 
4. RBC Rome 1928, Art. 19: an Exception to National Treatment? 
.The discussion up till now has not mentioned a possible problem for states 
bound by RBC Berlin 1908 or Rome 1928. Under Art. 19 of those texts: 
"The provisions of the present convention shall not prevent a claim being 
made for the application of any wider provisions which may be made by the 
legislation of a country of the Union in favour of foreigners in general." This 
confusing Article, first introduced in RBC Berlin 1908, was eventually 
amended at Brussels 1948 by removing the final words, "in favour of for-
eigners in general", after an attempt to do so at Rome in 1928 failed. 98 
Read literally, Art. 19 suggests that RBC membe:J;s can claim rights greater 
than the RBC minima only when the other RBC forum extends such protec-
tion to "foreigners in general" .99 If the legislation simply grants greater rights 
• B. A., LL. B. (Hons.) (Auckland), J. D. (Chicago); Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto. 
•• Part One of this article was published in 17 ITC 577 (1986). 
98 RAESTAD, supra note 30, at 229; LADAS, supra note 3, at 190 et seq. Some minor inconse-
quential drafting changes were made to Art. 19 at Stockholm 1967, principally the substitu-
tion of "greater" for "wider" before "protection". 
99 "Documents", supra note 45, at pp. 105, 379. 
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to its own nationals, Art. 19 arguably would not apply. This would 
undercut the fundamental principle of BC 1886 that a BC author sho 
able to claim national treatment if the national legislation confers I 
rights on nationals alone. 
Fears that Art. 19 in its original form had this effect seem in hind 
unwarranted. Before 1908, some Belgian courts had held that RBC mefu 
could claim only the minimum rights guaranteed by the RBC even th 
Belgian law conferred greater rights and made them available to for · 
generally, without condition of reciprocity. Under this theory, the RBC 
vented its members obtaining protection an RBC state purported to e 
to all foreigners. Disagreeing with this interpretation, the Belgium del 
at Berlin, with Italy's support, proposed an amendment to overturn 
views which it feared might gain currency in other RBC states. More 
non-RBC states might be deterred from joining the Union if they tho 
that their authors would lose existing protection. 
The amendment Belgium proposed accurately reflected its intention by c 
firming that RBC protection was only a minimum and was without prej 
to more liberal national laws. ic>o Unfortunately, although Belgium'sre 
ing appears to have been adopted, 101 the language of its proposed a 
ment was not. The proposal was redrafted and passed in the delphic form 
out in Art. 19. 
The apparent inconsistency between Arts. 4 and 19 of RBC (Berlin 
Rome) justifies recourse to the Berlin travaux preparatoires. These ind· 
that Art. 19 was inserted out of abundant caution. It did not intend to 
down the basic principle of national treatment in Art. 4 of RBC Berlin 
Rome; nor did it intend to expand the concept of author's rights. Rather, 
intended to deal with the special case of a domestic law that was drafted 
cover both nationals and all foreigners: RBC nations could claim the bene 
of such a law. Article 19 did not intend that they could claim wider prate 
only in such a case: this would be inconsistent with Art. 4(1). The B 
1948 amendment, in eliminating the last six words of Art. 19, returned t 
form of wording that eliminated the possibility of any argument and reiri, 
forced the intent of Art. 4(1). 
RBC (Berlin and Rome) Art. 19 therefore does not affect the basic princi 
of national treatment set out in Art. 4 of those Conventions. Nor does Art· 
19, as it has appeared in its current form since RBC (Brussels 1948), in 
way affect the above analysis of the national treatment provisions in the 1 
and later texts. 
100 "Proces-Verbaux", supra note 61, at pp. 94-96. 
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What Rights Are Subject to National Treatment under the RBC? 
at "rights" fall within the national treatment requirement of RBC (Paris 
1) Art. 5(1)? The provision itself includes three classes: 
) rights which a country's laws presently grant to nationals; 
rights which a country's laws later grant to nationals; 
rights specially granted by the Convention.
102 
das argues that "rights" should be broadly interpreted; any other view 
d be a "dangerous theory" .103 But what is meant here by "rights"? As is 
on in legal matters, the black and white ends of the spectrum are clear 
ugh; it is the grey shading in the middle that causes difficulty. 
tan abstract level, the owner of a right must possess it against some per-
n(s); the right relates to some act or omission of that person and must be 
rceable by law .104 As used in the RBC, an author's right tracks the 
ary meaning common to most national copyright laws: an author has in 
lation to his/her work the right to exclude others from reproducing or using 
ework in some way. The RBC extends this primary meaning to include a 
ght to receive remuneration from the user of the work, even where the 
thor is unable to prevent the use.105 Again, the right must be understood in 
sense contemplated by the RBC and not merely a state's domestic law. 
ne can envisage a state compensating authors for uses made of their works, 
ways that fall outside this concept of rights. Thus, a state might choose to 
otect a work's ideas rather than its expression. It would then depart from 
e RBC understanding of authors' rights and, for that matter, copyright; 
ch a right would be outside the RBC. More specifically, if home taping of 
pyright works was thought detrimental to authors, a scheme could be 
ablished whereby home taping was made legal. To compensate authors for 
h uses, the government could then distribute monies from a fund set up 
om general taxation or even from taxation specially levied on manufactur-
102 The provision in essentially this form dates back to RBC Berlin 1908, Art. 4. Indeed, apart 
from the rights mentioned under (c), it dates even further back to the original BC 1886, 
Art. 2. 
103 LADAS, supra note 3, at 268. See too Gribble v. Man. Free Press Co. Ltd, supra note 19, at 
573. 
104 FrrzGERALD (ed.), "Salmond on Jurisprudence" (12th ed., 1966, Sweet & Maxwell, Lon-
don), 221-222. 
105 As in RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 1100(2) where the author's right to authorize public radiodiffu-
sion of his/her works may be regulated by the state, but not so as to prejudice the author's 
moral right or the author's right to receive an "equitable remuneration". 
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ers of home taping hardware or software. The author would have a " · 
against the fund but it would not be in respect of a particular use 
particular user, any more than paying the proceeds of a tax levied on 
manufacturers of handguns to the victims of gun crimes would be conside 
a victim's right against gun manufacturers. This sort of "right" may well 
beyond the concept of "rights" contemplated by Art. 5(1); if so, it would 
be subject to the principle of national treatment.106 
Article 5(2) does not affect this conclusion. 107 It refers in its first sentence 
the "enjoyment and exercise of these rights", i.e., the rights just ment 
under Art. 5(1). In its second sentence, it refers to "the author" and 
rights". Article 5(2) therefore intends to elaborate the consequences oft 
principle of assimilation but does not intend to enlarge the basic concept 
"author's rights" .108 
This view concedes a state's power to deal with a perceived inequity 
means other than granting an individual a legal cause of action ag · 
wrongdoer. Nothing in the RBC requires a state to benefit authors by pro 
ing solutions within a copyright framework if it considers another scheme 
be politically, economically or socially more expedient. Thus, domaine pub 
payant (royalties from public domain works paid into a fund to support Ii · 
authors), social security payments, and tax reductions or subsidies given 
authors in respect of the publication of their works are not "rights" subject 
Art. 5(1).109 
The sort of rights that are subject to Art. 5(1) seem to be rights exp 
enumerated in the RBC, either as rights states are obliged or entitl 
grant, or rights in pari materia. Thus, as suggested above, a state could 
the author of a computer program in source or object code the right 
convert it into machine code. Special mention however should be made 
the droit de suite and the public lending right. 
106 STEWART, "International Copyright in the 1980s" 28 Bull. Cop. Soc. 351, at 368-369 (1 
(STEWART III); cf. STEUP, supra note 41, at 287. A state acting thus might be in 
RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 9(1) by not sufficiently providing for the author's right to a 
reproduction of his/her work or going beyond the exceptions to that right permitted in 
9(2), but that is another matter. 
107 The provision appears supra, in text following note 22. 
108 Commentators who concentrate on Art. 5(2) to claim that any scheme benefiting auth 
must be granted national treatment thus miss the point: see, e.g., SEEMAN," A Look at 
Public Lending Right" 30 ASCAP Cop. Law Symp. 71, at 94-96 (1980). 
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'or to the RBC 1928, firm BC adherents such as France and Belgium 
troduced adroit de suite in 1920 and 1921, entitling artists and their heirs to 
share in the increased value of their copyright works when publicly sold, 
t extended its application to foreigners only on the basis of reciprocity. No 
untry commented adversely on this limitation at Rome in 1928 where a 
eu requesting states to consider adopting adroit de suite was adopted. Nor 
they in 1948 at Brussels when the right almost failed to be introduced 
the British, Dutch and Nordic delegations felt unable to accept it as a 
ventional obligation. The Dutch delegation specifically denied that the 
t could be considered an "author's right". A compromise was reached: 
droit de suite was introduced as Art. 14bis of the RBC but no member was 
'ged to enact it. Moreover, the right was subjected to material reciprocity 
ther than national treatment.
110 
p to 1948, therefore, a general consensus existed excluding the droit de suite 
m the "rights" covered by Art. 5(1). It is now excluded from the national 
eatment provision because of the express provision in RBC (Brussels) Art. 
Wis (now RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 14ter) subjecting it to material reciprocity. It 
would thus be paradoxical if a state bound to the RBC prior to Brussels 1948 
were obliged to extend national treatment if it enacted a droit de suite, but a 
.state bound at the level of Brussels 1948 or later had to grant material 
reciprocity only. Especially in light of the historical trend to increase levels of 
protection with each successive revision of the BC, this paradox cannot 
represent the legal position. 
>In truth, the droit de suite is exceptional in a scheme either of copyright or 
author's right: it does not relate to the use of the work, but rather to the 
obtaining of a share of the profits on resale. Nor is it a right to exclude or to 
receive compensation on use.111 As an exceptional non-obligatory right 
exempt even under the latest RBC text from the fundamental principle of 
110 "Documents", supra note 45, at 362-368. Cf. R.AESTAD, supra note 30, at 73 et seq. 
111 Accord: KATZENBERGER, "The 'Droit de Suite' in Copyright Law" 4 IIC 361, 378-379 
(1973); ULMER, supra note 41; "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at 92 (semble); RECHT, "Has 
the 'Droit de Suite' a Place in Copyright?" 3 UNESCO Cop. Bull. 51 (1950). 
Contra: LADAS, supra note 3, at para. 123; NoRDEMANN, "The 'Droit de Suite' in Article 
14ter of the Berne Convention and in the Copyright Law of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many", Copyright (1977), 337 at 340 (as from 1948); "The Charter", supra note 5, at 29 (no 
reasoning is offered to support the conclusion); SCHULDER, "Art Proceeds Act: A Study of 
the 'Droit de Suite' and a Proposed Enactment for the United States" 61 Nw. U.L.R. 19, 
42-43 (1966) (but the reasoning appears vitiated by the wrong assumption at n. 91 that 
France has always considered the droit de suite as an author's right and available to all RBC 
states without condition of material reciprocity). 
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national treatment, it does not support an argument that the fundamen 
concept of authors' rights has somehow changed since 1948. 
(b) Public Lending Right 
A number of countries have introduced a public lending right for books 
have not extended it to foreigners. 112 If the scheme takes the form of gi • 
the author a right to receive remuneration from an entity such as a lib 
each time it authorizes a person to borrow his/her book, a good argum 
exists for treating the right as an "author's right" under Art. 5(1). It is ari 
to receive remuneration on use of the work, a sort of right of distribution 
renting right. Whether or not a state includes the scheme in its copy · 
legislation is irrelevant to the obligation to provide national treatment.1 
Many states compensating authors for public lending have not proceeded in 
this way. They have reached an equivalent result by setting up a fund estab-
lished from general revenue or by specific taxation on lending facilities, and.· 
distributing it in some predetermined manner to authors. Such a scheme is 
more a form of welfare legislation directed towards a particular class than !l 
form of "author's right" against any user or lending facility in respect of a 
particular use of the author's work: it may well be outside Art. 5(1). 114 
D. Universal Copyright Convention 
As is well known, the purpose of the UCC was to allow countries - princi. 
pally the United States, but also other Pan-American and Asian countries-
whose copyright principles and requirements prevented them joining the 
RBC to adhere to an international copyright treaty that included RBC mem-
bers, and thus to minimize "back-door" reliance on the RBC. It was recog-
112 For a summary of countries, see BROPHY, "A Guide to Public Lending Right" (1983, 
England), para. 1.10. 
113 ULMER, supra note 41, at 22-23; STEUP, supra note 41, at 281-282. See also 1931 H;C· 
Debates (Canada), at p. 2432: "If something in the Copyright Act is in contravention ofthe 
Rome convention, we have no right to put it somewhere else" (Mr. Rinfret). 
114 STEWART III, supra note 106; STEUP, supra note 41, at 288. Contrary views (a) simply assert 
that every right flowing from authorship is subject to national treatment, without analyzing 
the concept of a "right" (e.g., NORDEMANN, "Public Lending Rights in Federal Germany" 
90 R.I.D.A. 61, at 82-83 (1976)); or (b) wrongly focus on Art. 5(2) without appreciating 
that provision does not enlarge the concept of "rights" under Art. 5(1) (see, e.g., SEEMAN, 
supra note 108). 
Of course, whether or not the scheme appears in a state's copyright law is irrelevant: the 
accident of location does not turn a "non-right" into a "right", and vice versa. 
Article I 
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ed from the start that the UCC would be practically worthless unless the 
ited States joined and that the achievement of this goal would require a 
comprehensive and coercive treaty than the RBC. Obtaining political 
roval to the UCC in the United States would be difficult enough without 
ecting the U.S. to make major legislative changes to the works and rights 
uiring protection. Just as was the case with the BC 1886, a modest treaty 
uld, in Judge Wyzanski's metaphor, be a stairway which states would 
wly mount, step by step, perhaps ultimately reaching the landing of a 
nified RBC/UCC. 
}tis thus not surprising that the UCC, as eventually drafted in 1952 and even 
as revised in 1971, covers fewer works and gives states greater discretion and 
xibility in the nature and degree of protection for those works than does 
the RBC. 
1. What Works Fall under the UCC? 
Article I of the UCC reads: "Each Contracting State undertakes to provide 
for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other 
copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writ-
ings, musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engrav-
ings and sculpture." 
Articles II.1 and II.2 reject the principle of material reprocity and endorse 
the principle of assimilation: UCC nationals "shall enjoy the same protec-
tion" for their published and unpublished "works" in another UCC state as 
nationals of the latter. Apart from a requirement to protection certain 
minimum rights first introduced in the 1971 text of the UCC,115 the provisions 
of Arts. I and II in the 1952 and 1971 texts of the UCC are identical. 
In its ordinary meaning, the language of Art. I imposes two obligations. 
First, states must "provide for adequate and effective protection" of authors' 
rights. This gives them greater flexibility than RBC states over what rights 
should be accorded to works and how the rights should be qualified. Sec-
ondly, like the RBC, the rights must be those of "authors ... in literary, 
scientific and artistic works". 
All these terms must have a Convention meaning, not whatever meaning 
.states choose to give them. States must therefore ensure that all works qual-
ifying as literary, scientific or artistic are included in their copyright laws, 
except to the extent that travaux preparatoires reveal a contrary intent. As 
115 See UCC 1971, Art. II.l, II.2, IVbis. 
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will be discussed below, the travaux do indeed permit states a certain limi 
discretion to depart from the well-established meaning of the phrase in 
tain cases but, significantly, do not indicate that states are entirely free 
interpret these words as they think fit. Article I could have been draft 
"each state undertakes to protect the rights of authors in such works as 
state in its own unfettered discretion decides to be literary, scientific and a 
tic works". But it was not, nor was any suggestion of this kind made at 
Conference, nor is there any reason to interpret Art. I as if those words w 
there. Otherwise, a state could comply with Art. I by including only 
specific examples in Art. I and adding books, logarithm tables and pain· 
It could say in all good faith that, after due deliberation, it has decided 
return to 18th century notions of copyright and recognize only the latt 
additions as literary, scientific and artistic works. The UCC framers cert 
did not contemplate this result. Yet the result would follow if the te 
"literary, scientific and artistic works" were not given a meaning fixed by th 
Convention as including all present and future works falling fairly within tha 
phrase. 
For the reasons already elaborated in connection with the RBC,116 "wor 
in Art. II, and indeed in the many other Articles in which that word appears, 
must mean those works covered by Art. I: any other conclusion would mean 
that this key word has some fluctuating meaning varying from one provision 
to another. Therefore, a work that is not "literary, scientific and artistic" ·· 
that is not specifically enumerated in Art. I is not pr<'tected by the UCC. 
Two objections may be made to this view. The first appeals to state practice; 
Both RBC and UCC states frequently extend the protection of the whole of 
their copyright laws to all other Unionist states, without limiting the 
categories of works to those falling under Art. I. Thus, the United States 
extended the protection of its Copyright Act 1976 generally to allf,ublished 
UCC works as "work" is defined in secs. 102 and 103 of that Art. 11 But state 
practice such as this is ambiguous and thus legally irrelevant. A state may 
116 Text supra accompanying notes 34 et seq. 
117 Accord: BoosCH, "The Law of Copyright under the Universal Copyright ConventiOn" (3rd 
rev. ed., 1968), at pp. 11, 7; DE SANCTJS, "The International Copyright Conventions", 
Copyright (1978) 254, at 256-257; STEWART I, supra note 39, at para. 6.05; KARNELL, supra 
note 78; EscARRA, "La Convention universelle du droit d'auteur du 6 septembre 1952" 6 
Rev. Trim. de Dr. Comm. 65, at 67-68 (1953). Tue travaux preparatoires support this 
conclusion: UNESCO, "Records of the Intergovernmental Copyright Conference, Geneva, 
18 August - 6 September 1952" (1955, Switzerland), at pp. 74 ("Rapporteur-General's 
Report" on Art. I), 130-137, passim (Main Commission Minutes). 
118 17 U.S.C. s. 104(b). But note that semiconductor chips, at one time mooted for ordinary 
copyright protection, were eventually subjected to material reciprocity rather than national 
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nclude that the costs of discriminating between states depending upon 
at works they protect or of including material reciprocity provisions out-
igh the benefits that the simplicity of national treatment involves. Alterna-
ely, the extension may have been because of other bilateral or multilateral 
ligations binding the state, or may have been voluntary for broader 
ategic reasons such as those suggested at the beginning of this study .
119 
condly, Ulmer appears to take a different view on this point from the one 
e correctly took on the similar point under the RBC.
120 
His premise is that a 
ork" can fall under Art. II even though it is excluded from the obligation 
Art. I. So architecture, which Ulmer excludes from the obligation of 
. I, can fall under Art. II. However records, also outside Art. I, do not 
ording to Ulmer fall under Art. II: they are not "works" in the UCC sense 
ause they fall under neighbouring rights, not copyrights.
121 
Relying on the 
e premise as Ulmer, Dawid reaches the opposite conclusion: records are 
orks" under Art. II.
122 
at two commentators can reach a diametrically opposite result while start-
from the same premise suggests that the premise is wrong. Ulmer is right 
saying that records do not fall under the UCC, but this is not simply 
ecause they are not "works": it is because they are neither literary, scientific 
r artistic works nor the works of an author. They do not fall under Art. I; 
therefore, they do not fall under Art. II. Ulmer's architecture example is 
similarly right for the wrong reason. Ulmer correctly seems to accept that 
hitecture is under Art. I an artistic work of an author, but one that, 
according to the UCC travaux,123 states are free in their discretion to exclude 
from protection. He fails to note that architecture is subject to national 
treatment under Art. II not merely because it is a "work" but because it is an 
artistic work, albeit subject to optional protection. 
The interpretation we have suggested ensures that the relationship between 
RBC (Paris 1971) Arts. 2(1) and 5(1) (and corresponding provisions in previ-
ous texts) and UCC Arts. I and II is symmetrical. Apart from this logical 
neatness, the result was no doubt intended both by the RBC adherents to the 
119 See text accompanying note 6, supra. Indeed, in the case of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 
only the extension of protection to U.N. or O.A.S. publications was claimed to be "a treaty 
obligation of the United States" (House Report No. 94-1476 (94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976), 
at p. 58); the silence on other treaty obligations may imply that the U.S. was surpassing 
them in some respects. 
120 Supra note 41, and accompanying text. 
121 Supra note 41, at p. 21. 
122 Supra note 31, at 7. 
123 Text infra accompanying note 125 and notes 145-146. 
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DCC familiar with the RBC structure and by the non-RBC states that look 
on the UCC as a bridge towards future adherence to the RBC. A contr 
interpretation unnecessarily forces the word "work" in Art. II to carry some 
undeterminable and unbounded meaning that it has hitherto not had: any., 
thing a state in its own discretion chooses to call copyrightable subject-
matter. 
States nevertheless have some discretion in defining the concept of "work"; 
Just as for the RBC, 124 they may require a degree of intellectual creativity 
~ co~dit~on of p7otection. ~urther, although "work" will normally imply 
fixat10n m matenal form, this may not be a necessary element. True, the 
RBC provision, dating back from Rome 1928, that a work includes "every 
production ... , whatever may be the mode or form of its expression", a 
phrase that arguably makes fixation optional, was deliberately not included 
in the DCC. Moreover, an attempt specifically to include oral works in Art. I 
was unsuccessful when the United States pointed out its constitutionalinabil~ 
ity to protect non-"writings". However, the significance of these events was 
not to exclude oral works from the ambit of the UCC; rather, it was "to allow 
each country to follow its own general doctrine on the basis of the good faith 
without which no international instrument could be effective" .125 Thus, states 
remain free in their discretion to include oral works within Art. I. 
II 
The protection of Art. I extends to "the ri§hts of authors" in "literary, 
scientific and artistic works." Both phrases12 were obviously deliberately 
chosen from the RBC and must have been intended to have the same open" 
textured meaning as in that text. 127 Thus, to the extent that computer pro-
grams are included within the RBC, 128 they should equally fall under the 
DCC. 
124 Text supra, accompanying notes 51-52. 
125 UNESCO, supra note 117, at pp. 132, 135 (statement of Mr. Farmer, U.S. delegation); see 
also p. 131 (Mr. Lokur, Indian delegation). 
126 The addition of the category of "scientific" works is immaterial for present purposes. This 
was included to ensure that such things as logarithm tables and works on nuclear physics 
would be covered: UNESCO, supra note 117, at 74 ("Rapporteur-General's Report"). Such 
works are expressly included within the definition of literary and artistic works of RBC 
(Paris 1971), Art. 2(1) and prior texts; see also Cuisenaire v. South West Imports Ltd, supra 
note 57, at 510 ff. 
127 "(Prima facie) where no deviation was intended, the UCC is to be interpreted in the same 
manner as the Berne Convention": STEUP, supra note 41, at 283. 
128 Text supra accompanying notes 78 et seq. 
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n the other hand, proposals to incorporate the RBC (Brussels 1948) Art. 
1) definition of literary and artistic works into the UCC failed at the 1952 
ooference, and thus many of the examples of literary and artistic works 
:included in the RBC are omitted from the UCC. This omission was said to 
occur for two reasons: enumeration of many examples would be "dangerous" 
because literary, scientific and artistic works "might be read limitatively129 
d because the inclusion of certain works would make it difficult for certain 
countries to join the Convention" .130 
Logically, however, there may be two alternative results of excluding particu-
lar works from the mutual undertaking contained in Art. I. First, states may 
have a discretion to treat such works as literary, artistic or scientific under 
Art. I. If they do so treat them, those works would fall under Art. II. 
Alternatively, the excluded works would be impliedly removed from the 
coverage of the treaty. A state that chose to protect them would do so 
voluntarily outside the UCC. The former seems the more plausible alterna-
tive in the light of the travaux. 131 
(a) Performers, Recordings, Editions and Broadcasts 
Performers' rights, sound recordings, 132 published editions and broadcasts 
are not covered by the UCC. They are not "literary and artistic works" under 
·the RBC nor are they produced by an "author". The same reasons for 
129 (E.g., if "dog" is defined as including "doberman pinscher and great Dane", a noscitur a 
sociis interpretation might read "dog" as applying only to large short-haired canines, 
thereby excluding chihuahuas and English shepherds.) 
130 UNESCO, supra note 117, at 74 ("Rapporteur-General's Report"). 
131 Supra note 125 and accompanying text; TANNENBAUM, "The Principle of 'National Treat-
ment' and Works Protected: Articles I and II", in KUPFERMAN & FONER (eds.), "Universal 
Copyright Convention Analyzed" (1955, N.Y.), p. 13 at 16. 
132 Accord: NIMMER, supra note 69; "Ilsley Report", supra note 68; "Dalglish Report", supra 
note 67, paras. 73 and 233 (sound recordings excluded from UCC); see also text accom-
panying notes 120 et seq., supra. 
Some opinions issued after the signing of the UCC claimed that the sound portion of a 
movie would be protected under the UCC either as part of a "cinematograph work" (a 
specifically enumerated category of work under Art. I) or as a separate work, thereby 
suggesting that sound recordings themselves might qualify under Art. I: KUPFERMAN & 
FoNER, supra note 131, at pp. 17 TANNENBAUM); 436n. (interim lnter-Govermental Copy-
right Committee). But these opinions were issued in order to expedite the enactment of 
U.S. legislation implementing the UCC; they are not authoritative expositions of the 
UCC's meaning; and, in any event, that part of a work may be protected within the 
framework of a larger work does not mean that the part has separate copyright under a 
different category. 
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excluding them from the RBC apply equally to the UCC. Two addi 
comments are perhaps pertinent. 
First, the notion of an "author" was well known to the participants, inclu 
the United States whose delegation included two members (Messrs. 
and Schulman) who had also been observers at the RBC Brussels 1948 
ference. True, the UCC's preamble does refer to "copyright prote 
literary, scientific and artistic works", but then it also refers to respec · 
"rights of the individual" and disseminating "works of the human 
More importantly, Art. I includes the phrase "rights of ... other co 
proprietors" in addition to "the rights of authors". This language, as w 
other references to "copyright" throughout the text, was included to acco 
date the U.S., a "copyright" rather than "authors' right" country. But 
additional language in Art. I is too slim an indication of any intent to e 
the notion of authorship, something that had been rejected so recently 
RBC Brussels 1948.133 A Nordic proposal to excise the phrase from Art. I 
grounds of tautology was withdrawn after the U.S. delegation explained 
the words were necessary to deal with a peculiarity of U.S. law whereby t 
author of a "work for hire" is the worker's employer, not the worker h 
herself .134 The phrase also ensured that the author's assignees or heirs w 
entitled to UCC protection, 135 thus parallelling RBC (Brussels) Art. 2( 4) an 
its successors. Little else can be made of the addition. 
Secondly, the many proposals made at the 1952 UCC Conference to add t 
the list of enumerated objects in Art. I never went beyond items such as 
those appearing in the RBC. Specifically, no mention was made of broad-
133 Supra note 45. Indeed, at the time Clause 1 of Protocol 2 protecting U.N. and O.A.S .. 
publications was agreed to, the Director of the Berne Bureau (Mr. Mentha) read a state-
ment, in response to queries by some delegates, that the provision "in no wise conflicts with , 
the rule that only natural persons can create intellectual works and, in that capacity, have 
their copyright as original authors recognized"; he reaffirmed "a principle which is in 
conformity with human laws and with a sound interpretation of the notion of copyright": 
UNESCO, supra note 117, at 169. 
134 UNESCO, supra note 117, at 135 (Mr. Farmer, U.S. delegate). As to the Nordic proposal, see 
id., 132-133, 136; cf. text supra accompanying notes 47-49. Since the proprietor may be a 
juristic person, the problem of who is the author of a cinematographic work may be more 
easily overcome under the UCC than under the RBC: DESBOIS, FRANCON & KEREVER, 
"Les conventions internationales du droit d'auteur et des droits voisins" (1976, Dalloz}, at 
73-74; STEWART I, supra note 39, para. 6.07. Equally, states may treat corporations as 
"nationals": UNESCO, supra note 117, at 76 ("Rapporteur-General's Report"); cf. under the 
RBC, supra note 45. 
135 BoGSCH, supra note 117, at p. 7; BOGUSLAVSKY, "The U.S.S.R. and International Copy-
right Protection" (Moscow, 1979), at 150; NEWCITY, "Copyright Law in the Soviet Union" 
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, sound recordings, published editions or performers' rights. 136 Having 
d to the history of the RBC Brussels Conference just four years previ-
y, this diplomatic silence is eloquent. 
specific examples in Art. I, "writings, musical, dramatic and cinemato-
hic works, and paintings, engravings and sculptures" present, with one 
'ble exception noted below, few problems of interpretation. All appear 
C (Brussels 1948 and Paris 1971) Art. 2(1); indeed, apart from 
matographic works, all date back to the origir.al 1886 BC. These exam-
will no doubt be given an interpretation similar to that given their 
terparts in the RBC. 137 
broad interpretation of some of the UCC examples may also include some 
the RBC examples omitted from the UCC. Thus, a dramatico-musical 
r'k could qualify under either UCC "dramatic" or "musical" work. 138 
reography and mime can qualify as an UCC "dramatic" work. Books and 
phlets can qualify as UCC "writings". Lectures, addresses, and sermons, 
qualify as UCC "writings", if fixed; if unfixed, they may qualify simply as 
erary works". Lithography may qualify as an UCC "engraving". Plastic 
rks relative to geography, topography, architecture or science may qualify 
UCC "sculpture". 
inematographic works present a possible difficulty. Quite apart from the 
ressure exerted by the motion picture industry to have this category 
ecified in the UCC, its inclusion was presumably thought necessary 
ause it had only recently been promoted to the category of literary and 
istic works in RBC (Brussels 1948). 139 The omission of a phrase such as 
136 UNESCO, supra note 117, at 131-137. The suggestion that phonograms might qualify as a 
"writing" (STEWART I, supra note 39, at para. 604) cannot be supported in the light of the 
travaux. Nor does any reason appear why "writing" in the UCC should bear a different 
meaning from the RBC, where it decidedly does not include phonograms: cf BoGsCH, 
supra note 117, at 8-9; DE SANCTIS, "The Paris Revisions (July 1971) of the Universal 
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention", Copyright (1972) 241, at 248 (n.18). 
That phonograms may be "writings" within the U.S. Constitution provision on copyright is 
irrelevant, just as would be the fact that another country does not under its national law 
treat them as "writings". 
137 Cf BoGsCH, supra note 117, at pp. 8-9. 
138 Accord: STEWART I, supra note 39, at para. 6.04. 
139 See text supra accompanying notes 59 et seq. Apparently, the fuller enumeration of 
categories in RBC (Brussels) was one reason why only 13 states had ratified it by 1952: 
UNESCO, supra note 117, at 135 (Brazil delegate). 
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"including works produced/expressed by a process analogous to cinemat 
phy", dating back to RBC (Berlin 1908), might suggest that telefilm 
videograms, to the extent they fall under this extended definition rather 
simply "cinematographic works", are excluded. Bogsch thinks othe · 
equates cinematographic works with "silent or sound motion pictures" 
claims that genre, mode of realization and technical processes are irrele 
to the question of what constitutes a cinematographic work. 140 This see 
reasonable view: it focuses on the similarity of the creative processes 
type of medium involved, and proceeds on the premise that the RBC p 
was omitted for reasons of brevity rather than to exclude its subject 
ter .141 Television broadcasts are however probably excluded for the s 
reasons as are radio broadcasts .142 
(c) RBC Examples Omitted from the UCC 
A number of the examples in RBC (Paris 1971) Art. 2(1) that are omit 
from the UCC and that do not easily fall within other UCC examples 
nonetheless fall within the general term "literary, scientific or artistic wo 
Illustrations, geographical charts, plans and sketches should qualify as "Ii 
ary, scientific or artistic works". So, no doubt, will derivative works (e. 
translations and adaptations) and collective works (encyclopaedias and 
thologies). 
Works of applied art also fall under "artistic works", but the reference inArt. 
IV.3 to "works of applied art in so far as they are protected as artistic works''. 
demonstrates an intent to allow states to exclude this category from protec-
tion under Art. I. If they do include it in their domestic law, they are bound· 
to afford national treatment under Art. II. 143 
Similarly, photographic works are not specifically mentioned in Art. I but 
Art. IV.3 refers to them, thereby indicating that they are included 1mder , 
Art. I as "artistic works". The reference in Art. IV.3 to states "which protect 
photographic works" however indicates that protection is optional; if 
afforded, it is subject to national treatment under Art. II. 144 
140 Supra note 117, at p. 9. Accord: DUBIN, supra note 60. 
141 See text supra accompanying notes 60-71. 
142 Text supra accompanying note 132 et seq.; cf. GRIFFIN, "The Universal Copyright Conven-
tion and the Problem of Community Antenna Television Systems" 3 Ohio No. U.L.R. 535, 
at 546 (1975). 
143 Accord: BoGSCH, supra note 117, at p. 10; ROYAL COMMISSION ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADE MARKS AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS, "Report on Industrial Designs" (Ottawa, 1958), 
p. 6. 
144 Id.; ULMER, supra note 41, at 22. 
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rks of architecture were not listed among the examples in the original BC 
, but gained admission to the RBC at Berlin 1908. They may thus be 
dered "artistic works" within the meaning of the UCC. However, 
tecture was deliberately excluded as an example from Art. I, principally 
e the U.S. asserted its constitutional inability to protect this subject-
r.145 This does not mean that architecture is excluded from Art. I. 
er, just as for works of photography and applied art, states have a 
retion whether to include it; if they do, then it falls subject to Art. II.
146 
gsch takes a somewhat different approach from that outlined here. He 
arently accepts that the words in Art. I cannot be interpreted by each 
e as it thinks fit. However, pointing out that the phrase "literary, scien-
and artistic works" contains overlapping categories (e.g., is a film on 
lear physics literary, artistic or scientific?), Bogsch argues that the phrase 
st have the ambulatory meaning of "works susceptible of copyright pro-· 
tion". From this, he deduces that when categories of works, other than 
se specifically enumerated in Art. I, "are recognized as works by the 
stom of the civilized countries", they may fall within the ambit of Art. I.
147 
·s view is open to a number of objections. First, it lacks logic. Just because 
object may qualify as either A, B or C does not mean either that A, B and 
are meaningless or that they have some more abstract meaning or that they 
ould be discarded as categories. Rather, in an international treaty, the 
inference may be drawn that states have some discretion to categorize the 
object as either A, B or C according to their domestic cultural and legal 
oncepts. 
Secondly, if the states participating at the UCC conferences had intended to 
be bound by Bogsch's paraphrase, they would have used it instead of the 
well-known and internationally long-accepted phrase they deliberately did 
choose. They would not have bothered to agonize over what examples should 
or should not be included in Art. I and over such questions as whether the 
, word "scientific" should or should not be omitted from the phrase "literary, 
.scientific and artistic". 
145 UNESCO, supra note 117, at pp. 132, 135 (Mr. Farmer, U.S. delegation). 
146 But see ULMER, supra note 41, at 21, and text accompanying notes 120 et seq. supra. 
147 BoGSCH, supra note 117, at 9; see also "WIPO Guide", supra note 3, at 13. Cf. SCHULMAN, 
"International Copyright in the United States: A Critical Analysis" 19 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 141, at 151 (1954). 
I 
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Thirdly, Bogsch's view is too vague to be workable. 148 When will a wo 
sufficiently recognized and by how many countries for it to qualify? 
countries will qualify as "civilized"?149 What if some countries protect 
such as broadcasts, performances and sound recordings as "neighb 
rights" rather than traditional "author's works": will they be co 
amongst the "civilized countries" who include such works within their c 
ter on traditional works? Since most countries apart from the United St 
protect utilitarian works of architecture, does this make the U.S. pe 
nently "uncivilized" in this respect, permanently in breach of the UCC 
never in breach since, without U.S. participation, a civilized custom ca 
arise? 
In sum, the objections are similar to those suggested above in relation to 
RBC. It is one thing to say that the phrase "literary etc." works is an 
ended one, and that it is designed to embrace new forms of authors' int 
tual endeavours resulting in works that fall within the classically acce 
definition of "literary, etc." (as amplified by the examples in Art. I).150 
another to say that a tree planted by a gardener will ever be a liter 
scientific or artistic work, however many countries choose to call it that 
whatever their degree of "civilization" may be. 151 
The most that can be said is that interpretations of the UCC should march 
step with those of the RBC wherever possible; otherwise the many sta 
bound by both Conventions may be in a position of perpetual confusion. B 
even this view must be cautiously and selectively applied. Thus, as has be 
seen, the obligatory RBC meaning of "literary and artistic works" may 
tempered by the UCC travaux, allowing states a limited discretion to exclu 
from protection certain items that would otherwise fall within those 
categories. 
148 BoGSCH himself recognizes the difficulties of a test based on "some transcendent standards' 
of civilized countries" when discussing what "adequate and effective protection" means 
under Art. I: supra note 117, at 6-7. Indeed, at one point he calls this standard "logical 
though not overly helpful": id., at 5. The same comments apply to the test ifused in relation 
to works. 
149 Surely, those countries joining the UCC that favoured a circumscribed view of works 
eligible for copyright would not become bound to a meaning of copyright works that more 
"developed" countries, typically net exporters of copyright material, chose to adopt. Yet 
who is to say that the former countries are less "civilized" than the latter? 
150 DESBOIS, FRAN<;ON & KEREVER, supra note 134, at 73. Cf. STEWART I, supra note 39, at 
para. 6.04: "The description of works as 'literary, scientific and artistic' must not be taken in 
a literal sense"; nor, one might add, in a sense that ignores the history and intent of the text. 
151 Text supra, following note 55. 
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What Rights Are Subject to.National Treatment under the UCC? 
far as what rights must be accorded to protected works, DCC Art. II uses 
y different language from that in RBC Art. 5(1). 152 But no intention to 
eve a different result appears. The right in question must be an author's 
• 153 t. 
'cle IVbis of the 1971 text states that the rights under Art. I "shall include 
basic rights ensuring the author's economic interests", leaving it open to 
es to include basic rights ensuring authors' non-economic interests. True, 
oposal to include moral rights specifically within Art. I was defeated 
cipally because the United States claimed that, although its law recog-
d similar principles under libel or unfair competition theories, moral 
ts could not be constitutionally provided for under American copyright 
•154 The travaux reveal no intent to remove moral rights from the concept 
author's rights. Rather, they emphasize that the "adequate and effective 
tection" states undertook to provide did not necessarily include moral 
ts. If a state did voluntarily extend moral rights protection to authors, the 
. ation under Art. II to fsrovide the "same protection" to foreign works 
ld apply to moral rights. 55 Further support for the proposition that moral 
ts are rights contemplated by the UCC is gained from the fact that the 
lation right, the sole minimum right prescribed by the 1952 text, coo-
ns in Art. V.2 provisions in effect requiring states that permit compulsory 
nslation licences to acknowledge the original author's moral rights of 
ernity and integrity. 
pmaine public payant, made the subject of a voeu at the UCC 1952 in terms 
similar to the voeu at RBC Brussels 1948, 156 and other forms of author 
subsidies are clearly excluded. Whether or not public lending rights are 
152 See text supra preceding note 116. 
153 Spain's proposal to list a number of rights was rejected because, according to the Rappor-
teur-General, "these rights should include those given to authors by civilized countries but 
... an enumeration was dangerous, because it might read limitatively": UNESCO, supra note 
117, at 74. No intention to change the nature of authors' rights as understood under the 
RBC appears. · 
154 UNESCO, supra note 117, at 132, 135 (Mr. Farmer, U.S. delegate). A similar move to 
include moral rights within Art. IVb;, at UCC 1971 failed: UNESCO, "Records of the Confer-
ence for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention" (Paris, 1973), at 110-111; 65-66 
("General Rapporteur's Report"). Significantly, the U.S. did not claim that moral rights 
should be excluded from the concept of "author's right". 
155 WELLS, "The Universal Copyright Convention and the United States: A Study of Conflict & 
Compromise" 8 ASCAP Cop. Law Symp. 69, at 96 (1957); KURY, "Protection for Creators 
in the United States and Abroad" 13 ASCAP Cop. Law Symp. 1, at 22 (1964). 
156 UNESCO, supra note 117, at 98. 
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included depends, as for the RBC, on the nature of the scheme 
lished. 157 
As for the droit de suite, even a commentator such as Bogsch, who fa 
broad interpretation of the UCC, mentions the reciprocal nature of the 
in Belgium and Germany without adverse comment. 158 Presumably, B 
accepts that this is not an "author's right" under the UCC and therefore 
subject to national treatment.159 A state bound by both the RBCand 
entitled to condition the droit de suite by reciprocity;160 to require 
bound only by the UCC to extend national treatment would be ano 
especially given the lower level of obligation generally imposed by theU 
E. Conclusion 
There has been a noticeable tendency amongst some commentators 
states to assume or accept with perfunctory analysis that the interpretati 
be placed on what works and rights fall under the RBC and the UCC nati 
treatment requirements should be an expansive one. Occasionally, thiss 
to have been the result of wishful thinking, or of a natural and, perh 
commendable desire to create greater international copyright uniformity 
levels of protection without forcing states to resort to fresh treaties to c 
emerging or unforeseen problems. A natural reluctance of states to 
authoritative guidance from the International Court of Justice, the ulf 
arbiter of disputes under the RBC and UCC, has also contributed to do 
nal uncertainty and confusion. 
This study has concluded that any interpretation of the Conventions m 
consider the texts in the light of their history and purposes. Due regard m 
157 See text supra accompanying notes 112 et seq. Contra: NORDEMANN, supra note 114, 
pp. 83, 85. 
158 BoasCH, supra note 117, at pp. 235, 343. 
159 Text supra accompanying notes 109-111. Accord: Ulmer, supra note 41, at 18'-19, 
STEUP, supra note 41, at 288; .KATZENBERGER, supra note 111. Contra: NoRDEMANN, 
note 111, at 340-342, while noting that a pre-Conference proposal to make the droit de suite 
the subject of national treatment under the UCC was defeated; HAUSER, "The French 
Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged Artist under the Copy~ 
right Law" 6 Bull. Copr. Soc. 94, at 110 (1958); NIMMER, supra note 69, at para. 17.04[B], 
n. 6 (public lending right and tax on equipment should also qualify as rights "equivalent" to 
copyright; but are they in fact authors' rights?). 
160 Text supra accompanying notes 110 et seq. UCC Article XVIl and its Appendix Declaration 
contain the "Berne safeguard" clause: this ensures that the UCC does not affect the RBC, 
which continues to govern relations between RBC states who are also UCC members. 
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aid to the fact that the Conventions carry the indelible imprint of Conti-
tal notions of authors' rights in literary and artistic works, only smudged 
matically by Anglo-American notions of copyright. Once this is appreci-
' many of the apparent difficulties in the texts disappear and a coherent, 
gh not necessarily ideal, interpretation consistent with the basic intent of 
tramers can emerge. 
RBC and UCC were both drafted to ensure that many new develop-
ts may fairly fall within their coverage. But lines inevitably have to be 
in texts designed to be dynamic yet bounded. The sometimes unpalat-
conclusion may have to be reached that a newly emergent problem or 
tion cannot, upon a good faith purposive interpretation of the treaties, be 
luded within their coverage. Rather than engaging in semantic gymnastics 
fit the unfittable into the ambit of the Conventions, one may have to 
elude that persuading recalcitrant states to adhere to and ratify the latest 
s of existing Conventions or arranging new treaties may be the only 
ans available to cope with the problems of developing technology and lack 
international uniformity. 
Unfair Use of and Damage to the Reputation of 
Well-Known Trademarks, Names and Indications 
of Source in Switzerland and France** 
Introduction 
Well-known trademarks, names and indications of source represent commer-
cial assets whose exploitation appears increasingly attractive in commercial 
competition. This paper will explore several methods actually used to exploit 
or injure the reputation of such marks in one way or another. This may 
• Dr. jur.; Professor at Lausanne University; Director of the Centre universitaire de droit 
compare. 
** Lecture delivered at the working meeting of the section for industrial property and copyright 
law of the Society of Comparative Law on September 20, 1985, within the framework of the 
Conference on Comparative Law 1985 in Gottingen. 
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